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Abstract 
For almost all of human history both in ancient times and in modern 
contexts, talk about God has been mainly a male preserve. So 
closely has male God talk been associated by many with God’s own 
voice, that it is still not commonly realized and acknowledged. With 
the rise of feminism, especially during recent decades, it has 
changed. In this article the work of Daphne Hampson, a British 
feminist theologian, is considered: Her definition and critique of 
Christianity, her view of the relation between the present and our 
Christian past, specifically with regard to God talk, her dealing with 
prominent aspects of the Christian belief system and her emphasis 
on taking seriously all available knowledge and our contemporary 
context in doing theology. In line with some current trends in God 
talk, such as a movement away from anthropomorphism, and in 
dialogue with Friedrich Schleiermacher, she formulates what she 
calls a “future theism”.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the column “Kopstukke” in Beeld of 4 February 2006 Willie Burger, 
professor in Afrikaans literature at the University of Johannesburg, pointed, 
with reference to Paul Ricoeur,  to two kinds of reading of texts: the strategy of 
“seduction” by a text and that of reading a text “with suspicion”. The first kind 
of reading is about the suspension of disbelief while reading, about enjoying 
the story and becoming part its world. The second is about reading more 
carefully, about not suspending disbelief, about the asking of questions to a 
text, questions such as:  How does this text try to influence me? How are the 
norms and values of a society confirmed by it? Concerned specifically with 
fictional texts, Burger writes that the strategy of suspicion often destroys the 
enjoyment of the experience of the “world of the story”. Once one has become 
aware of how certain biases with regard to race, class, gender, religion and 
economic systems are confirmed by a text, it becomes more difficult to enjoy 
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the enchantment of the “other world”. Therefore one should perhaps not 
blame those who merely read for the joy of it, that is, without taking these 
matters into account. However, reading “with suspicion” is not without its 
compensation: it can teach us much about ourselves, our own prejudices and 
our blind spots. 
Although the first kind of reading, a reading of consent, is even in our 
time still the most common with regard to the reading of biblical texts, as much 
of biblical scholarship and the mass of popular religious literature make 
abundantly clear, the latter has for centuries been part of the biblical reading 
scene. In its subversion of the domestication of biblical texts and prominent 
figures that they portray historical study of the Bible in its different 
manifestations can in a sense be regarded as a reading “with suspicion”. One 
only thinks of the clear distinction which is made in Jesus research between 
the “historical Jesus” (or then “Jesuses”) and the dogmatic-popular ones, with 
the former problematising the latter. Especially during the past few decades 
more explicit ways of this kind of reading have come to the fore in the form of 
different kinds of ideological critical readings (Pippin 1997; Fuchs 2004:16). In 
the case of religious texts and of religion in general this is, of course, complex 
and contentious.  While most readers of biblical writings, like those of fictional 
texts, would still prefer to read, if not for the joy of it, then for comfort, 
confirmation and security, aspects of the Christian tradition and its impact, as 
well as the realities of our own society call in question this kind of reading as 
the sole one. In the case of the Bible and the Christian tradition a reading 
“with suspicion” entails looking at familiar writings and matters and at long 
held views with different eyes and therefore seeing differently, even seeing 
different things, pointing out origins and biases, asking questions about who 
wrote and spoke with whom in mind, exposing what is after many centuries of 
functioning regarded as obviously good as perhaps, even certainly, not so 
good. In the case of biblical texts a reading with suspicion entails the opposite 
of a hermeneutics of consent, of the reading of the Bible as religious scripture 
in which the inerrancy and truth claims of the texts are merely presupposed 
(Fuchs 2004:6, 7).  
 
2. FEMINIST/GENDER CRITICISM AS “READING WITH 
SUSPICION” 
One of the prominent ways of reading “with suspicion” during the past few 
decades has been reading biblical texts/Christian theology from a 
feminist/gender perspective, that is, using the analytical tool of gender to 
investigate the Christian religion, its sources, contexts and practices (Parsons 
2002:xiv). Like feminism in general, feminist biblical scholarship and theology 
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have during the past few decades become a diverse field in which there have 
been crucial developments. This is already clear from the use of the plural, of 
feminisms when referring to this field. An important development within the 
field, especially in the field of biblical scholarship, which takes seriously the 
problem of essentialism, has been a move to gender studies (Vorster 
2003:69-85). Not only has an immense amount of work been done in this field 
during the past four decades; a lot of  theoretical reflection, including critical 
self-reflection has taken place, covering matters such as essentialism, 
discourse theory, the problematisation of “woman” as a universal, detached 
from matters such as race and class, et cetera (Woodhead 1999; King & 
Beattie 2004). Gender-critical thinking in the field of biblical scholarship, 
theology and religion has indeed become a highly complex and sophisticated 
matter. Still not “natural” in the current social context, it has, in the words of 
King (2004:2) to be “intentionally developed through education and involves 
the radical transformation of consciousness, knowledge, scholarship and 
social practices”. A product of the modern era, and with its roots in the 
women’s movement of the nineteenth century, the way for it has at least partly 
been paved by critical biblical scholars, liberation theologians, and 
philosophers of language.   
 
3. FEMINISM AND CHRISTIANITY 
One facet of feminist theology, in which this article fits, has been its relation to 
or encounter with Christianity. In societies where inequality between the sexes 
is increasingly problematised, the question of feminists’ relation to patriarchal 
religious traditions has in a sense become inevitable. It is therefore 
understandable that 
 
almost every aspect of the doctrinal, organisational and conceptual 
identities of Christianity has been subject to some level of feminist 
enquiry. The nature and depth of this enquiry has often proved to 
be deeply challenging and sometimes transformative of Christianity. 
And has resulted in the emergence of what is largely considered to 




A crucial question in this debate has been that of the compatibility of 
Christianity and “feminisms” (Pears 2004:1-3). Most feminist biblical scholars 
and theologians have remained within the Christian tradition, and thought out 
new and more liberatory positions within it (Hampson 1998:64), as of course, 
many liberal male scholars did in the wake of modernity and are in our time 
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still doing (cf Berger 1980). This amounts to Christianity becoming, at least for 
some, an ever broader stream, aspects of which are continually reinterpreted, 
from which selections are continually made, and to which contemporary 
values are often first added and then extracted, sometimes consciously but 
perhaps more often unconsciously. In the field of feminist biblical 
scholarship/theology a number of options are taken: Scholars opt for 
strategies such as the radical reinterpretation of the Christian tradition (Carter 
Heyward), selecting what is regarded as liberatory strands in the tradition 
(Ruether) or the recovery and reconstruction of (what is regarded as) 
authentic or original Christianity, where women are thought to have played a 
more substantial role than has happened in the later stages of Christianity 
(Schüssler Fiorenza, cf Pears 2004:21ff). Apart from the detection of liberatory 
impulses within Christianity, reasons given for staying within Christianity, 
though differently conceived, is usually either that no real alternative is 
available (King 1999:110), or that no impact for change with regard to the 
position of women is possible from outside a specific religious tradition (Cady 
1999). A few, of whom Mary Daly is perhaps best known, have taken a 
different route, that of “climbing out” of the tradition and looking at it from a 
greater distance. It is to one of these scholars, Daphne Hampson, that 
attention will be paid here. A British systematic theologian, not a biblical 
scholar, her work can be described as a consistent reading with suspicion of 
the Christian myth/Christianity and some of its influential interpreters, male 
scholars as well as feminist ones, though mostly in a nuanced way. If the 
often quoted statement “Our heritage is our power” with regard to the past and 
its function in the present is not evident, and may even be untrue with regard 
to feminist women doing theology, it becomes important to give the word and 
listen to these women.  
 
4. THE WORK OF DAPHNE HAMPSON 
 
4.1 The scope of her work 
What makes Hampson’s work important is that she is in conversation, from a 
feminist perspective and in a comprehensive and concrete way, with specific 
aspects of the Christian tradition, to which she poses decisive questions. 
Significant, too, is  that, conversant in mainstream theology, and in 
conversation with influential male theologians and philosophers,  the scope 
and aim of her work is more comprehensive than feminism(s); her attempt to 
keep different kinds of insights/interests together; the consistency of her 
argumentation in an attempt to come up with “a view of her own”, specifically 
with regard to talk on God; her passionate appeal to think in step with 
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contemporary insights; the thought – and life – she has brought to her work, 
which, interrelated as these are in her work, inspire the reader to both thought 
and life, and the relatedness of her work to some forms of contemporary 
spirituality.  
 Reading with suspicion in an academic context is, of course, busying 
oneself on an intellectual level. This entails the careful definition of one’s own 
position, and the giving of reasons for a view held. This is done extensively by 
Hampson in her two main books Theology and feminism (1990) and After 
Christianity (1996, 2002), the book Swallowing a fishbone (1996), of which 
she is the editor, and a number of articles.  
 
4.2 Hampson’s definition of Christianity and her view of the relation to 
the past  
How, then does the position from which Hampson questions and argues look 
like? Her position and views are mainly informed by insights from feminism 
and those of the Enlightenment, which are, of course, not unrelated (cf 
Parsons 2002:xiii). Of her book After Christianity she wrote: “The basis of this 
book is that women (and therefore also men) are in a very different place to 
where they have been during the long years of Christian history. This cannot 
but have a profound influence on our religion” (Hampson 2002:xi). The other 
main aspect of her position is the Enlightenment and insights resulting from it. 
In fact, along with crucial feminist issues such as the emphasis on equality 
and justice, and what she calls “a different view of the world”, feminism partly 
has its roots in the fact that women started to think for themselves. It is 
precisely the insights which followed from the Enlightenment that make what 
she calls the “particularity” of Christianity problematic: “Thus it is impossible, 
according to what we now know about the world, that there could have been 
the ‘particularity’ which Christianity presupposes and is predicated upon, that 
is, some kind of ‘interruption’ in the causal nexus of history and nature” 
(Hampson 2002:xi, xiv). Not only did the Enlightenment provide us with a 
different view of the world; it also resulted in a different view of human beings. 
Part of the post-Enlightenment world, which forms the setting from which the 
task of theology is undertaken today, at least in the West, is that it is a context 
in which “humans have come into their own” (Hampson 2002:xi). In her view 
this calls for a different conceptualisation of God than that of pre-modern, 
patriarchal times.     
 Related to feminist and Enlightenment insights is her historical 
consciousness, which makes her extremely critical of the “ostrich position”, 
that is the kind of Christian theology according to which the past “revelation” 
can be transposed into our time “like a self- enclosed capsule and which holds 
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theological truth to exist in a sphere of its own, unaffected by scientific 
discoveries or knowledge we now have which clashes with what is believed to 
be biblical revelation” (Hampson 1990:14). Her aim is to be a religious person 
in tune with everything she knows about the world and her feminism, an 
intention reflected in one of her articles with the title “to be all of a piece, at 
peace” (Hampson 1992). 
 Hampson’s critique of Christianity closely coheres with her definition of 
it. For her Christianity refers to the Christian myth, according to which God 
intervened in history and is uniquely revealed in Jesus of Nazareth. She finds 
the implication of this, namely that God was in some sense differently related 
to particular events in a way which does not apply to other events or periods 
in history  unacceptable (Hampson 2002:6). Not only is “an intervention from 
above” contrary to what we now know of our world; claims to uniqueness, still 
essential to most of Christianity, has become increasingly problematic within 
the context of the world religions. She therefore rejects attempts to retain the 
uniqueness of Christianity: that of Bultmann who moved the (reality of) the 
resurrection to a different sphere and that of Kierkegaard who regarded 
Christianity’s truth of a different order (kind) than that of other knowledge 
(Hampson 1990:65; 2002:2). She also rejects a “broader” definition of 
Christianity, according to which being Christian merely consists in belonging 
to or living within the Christian tradition (Hampson 2002:63).  
 What, for Hampson, aggravates the matter, is that Christianity’s nature 
as a “historical religion” implies that the history to which Christians necessarily 
have to refer, which is in some sense normative for them, is a patriarchal 
history. What she realises, and concretely spells out, is that ancient 
patriarchal contexts form part and parcel of what Christians regard as a 
unique revelation, of its symbol system and of what is still used as sources for 
answers to present day questions (cf however Hampson and Ruether 1987, 
Ruether 1990 for a different understanding of what a “historical religion” 
entails). This causes her to say that not only is Christianity, defined in terms of 
the Christian myth, not true; in its view on women it is not moral (Hampson 
2002:xiii). She is therefore critical of attempts by feminist scholars who, 
realising the gap between past and present and taking the patriarchal context 
of biblical texts seriously, try to find a more ethical solution with regard to the 
relation between past and present than regarding its norms as a blueprint for 
the present (Hampson 1990:22).  
 She has been criticised for defining Christianity too narrowly and rigidly, 
and for the fact that her rejection of it as untrue is based on the view that 
Christians take aspects of their belief system (myth) such as the virgin birth 
and the resurrection literally, matters which could also be interpreted 
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metaphorically (e g Hampson and Ruether1987:3). And for the role of 
Enlightenment thought in her work. To define Christianity, as she does, in 
terms of the uniqueness of Jesus is, according to her, not a conservative 
position, as some of her critics maintain, but its widest possible definition 
(Hampson 1994:210; cf Tarnas 1991:113). Even if less rigidly defined, 
Christianity still necessarily has one foot in the past, making this past in some 
sense normative for present day people (Hampson 2002:51). This is clear 
from the fact that Christians usually do not merely decide in the light of 
present day insights what is ethical in and for their own time; they have to 
draw on the Bible, on the past for answers to present day questions. With 
regard to how the Bible is still implemented today, Hampson recalls how in 
1978 she was on a committee of the Anglican Church which had to decide 
whether Phoebe, the co-worker of Paul, was not simply a “deaconess” but a 
“deacon” in order to admit contemporary women to the office of deacon 
(Hampson 1990:31). Like many feminist scholars, she is fully aware of 
reductionist tendencies within Enlightenment thought and of the fact that it 
often did not favour women (Hampson 2002:6, 7). There is, however, in her 
view no going back behind these insights. Her position is actually more 
nuanced than what she sometimes gets credit for. While of the opinion that 
Christianity as a myth has been the lens that has formed people’s 
understanding of God in the West, she does point out that “some theological 
statements, by some Christian thinkers, may be profoundly true” (Hampson 
1994:214). And, though she wants the myth discarded in our time, she 
regards it as a past vehicle of something valid, namely human religious 
experience (1994:214).  
 If Hampson’s work may have, in the eyes of some of her critics, a 
modernistic slant, it should be remembered that the spirit of our so-called 
postmodern time does not exclude, but includes “virtually every important 
element of the Western intellectual past … forms of the modern sensibility, of 
the scientific mind, of Romanticism and the Enlightenment …” (Tarnas 1990: 
402, 403). Postmodernism is no instant way out of the problems posed by 
modernism. Refraining from beating about the bush, as Hampson does, may 
be helpful in view of the fundamentalist tendencies which are again in our time 
becoming characteristic of much of contemporary Christianity.  
 That Hampson is on the spot with regard to the perceived nature of 
Christianity and the way the Bible still functions  within much of it, is clear from 
a number of recent events in churches within the South African society. While 
the Dutch Reformed church recently decided on the bodily resurrection of 
Jesus, and by implication an “intervention from above”, as the linchpin of 
Christian identity, the Reformed churches are still searching the Scriptures for 
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the will of God with regard to the admission of women to the church offices. 
Not to mention the book and video “Five minutes after death” recently 
produced by the president of the Apostolic Faith Mission, where Christians 
who do not conform to orthodox dogmas are unashamedly sent to hell. A 
possible non-exclusivist, non-fundamentalist and tolerant variety of 
Christianity seemingly only exists, and is allowed to exist, in academic biblical 
scholarship and theology unattached to a specific church (cf Tarnas 1991:91-
119). Hampson’s position “After Christianity” is meant in a double sense.  
 
The position that I advocate is clearly after Christianity in that I think 
the myth of Christianity untenable on both moral and 
epistemological grounds ... But I am clear that it is in some sense 
after Christianity (and to some extent after Judaism) that we 
engage with these issues. Anyone who has had even a glimpse into 





She clearly thinks and writes from within the Western tradition, and admittedly 
does so. This implies that she does not pretend to speak on behalf of all 
women. It also implies that her position does not entail a total discontinuity 
with the past. She points out that we are indeed all embedded in religious 
traditions and cultures by which we have inevitably been influenced 
(2002:xviii).  In her attempt at reconceptualising God she relies especially on 
the work of the liberal Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher. There 
is, according to her, moreover, no reason why we should reject all that has 
been best about our Christian culture, not least its moral teaching (where that 
has been good), and its emphasis, for example on the value of persons 
(2002:xiii). “Human religion should, however, be historical in the sense in 
which other subjects and endeavours are historical … we shall have the 
freedom to draw on the past as we will and to discard what we will” (2002:51). 
This is a different relation to the past than that brought about by even radical 
reinterpretation of texts/traditions.  
 
4.3. Limits on reinterpretation?  
The validity of reinterpretation, a central issue in Hampson’s work, though 
presently crucial for feminist scholars and other forms of liberation theology, is 
of wider significance for the field of biblical scholarship and theology; it has not 
disappeared from the scene with the dawn of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism and the realisation, by philosophers of language, of the 
instability of language (cf Tarnas 1991:399). A classic statement of this 
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problem in a work of fiction is found in the conversation between Alice and 
Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s Through the looking-glass, commented 
upon by William Hamilton in his book The quest for the post-historical Jesus 
(1993), where the issue of reinterpretation is also at stake. In the conversation 
between Humpty Dumpty and Alice, Humpty Dumpty is of the opinion that, 
when he uses a word, it means just what he chooses it to mean. For him the 
real question is in the end “who is to be master” – that’s all. Alice, however, 
questions “whether you can make words mean so many different things” 
(Hamilton 1993:10). Commenting on this, Hamilton points out that the issue 
here is precisely that of the limits that can be imposed on the project of 
redefinition or reinterpretation. While the theological Humptys feel free in the 
name of relevance and liberation to reinterpret drastically, the Alices are of the 
opinion that the past of a word, the ways it has been used, have to be 
respected. One therefore cannot make a word mean whatever you choose. “If 
you cannot believe what the word  has once meant, you may not make up 
new meanings for it; you must do without it or invent altogether new words 
that do not claim to be interpretations of the old” (Hamilton 1993:12). In the 
case of a two thousand old religious tradition this is, of course, even more 
complex. With regard to the question of revisioning/reinterpretation Hamilton 
interestingly refers specifically to feminist theologians, where this is commonly 
done (cf O’Connor 1995; Pears 2004). It is clear that Hampson’s work fits into 
Alice’s view of language, or then the limits she puts on reinterpretation. 
“Words must mean something” she wrote in the book Swallowing a fishbone, 
in which she is in conversation with a number of feminist theologians. “There 
is no point in understanding by Christianity something it does not and cannot 
be stretched to mean” (Hampson 1996:3). In this regard she refers to the 
tendency among women who seek to remain within Christianity to twist 
Christianity to mean whatever they will. She thinks there is a certain 
dishonesty in this (Hampson 1996:3). Her kind of reading with suspicion 
therefore does not have two sides, as in the case of many other feminist 
theologians. In her case it is about deconstruction, not reconstruction (cf 
Pippin 1997). This would apply even if admitted that Christianity was initially 
more diverse and framework-less than it would become especially after the 
fourth century (Ruether 1991; Soskice 1996).  
 
4.4 Hampson and Schüssler Fiorenza  
Hampson’s view of the relation to the past, as well as what may be called her 
radical orientation to the present and to the future is put into clear perspective 
and argued forcefully in her article “On not remembering her” (1998) in which 
she responds to Schüssler Fiorenza’s book In memory of her (1983). The 
The work of Daphne Hampson 
240  HTS 63(1) 2007 
underlying question here is what the past can still do for us, specifically what 
its possibilities to empower are. The ground-breaking work done by Schüssler 
Fiorenza on early Christianity, in which she exposes the male biasedness of 
the Christian writings and points to the more substantial roles women in her 
view played in the early stages of Christianity, has been immensely influential 
in the field of feminist biblical scholarship and theology. To do justice to her 
work it has to be dealt with in a comprehensive and nuanced way, which 
respects its multi-faceted nature. This has been done in recent Festschrifts 
(2003, 2004). What is of interest here is that her approach to biblical writings 
and the Christian past is a both-and-one, that of both deconstruction and 
reconstruction, and one which is both historically and theologically driven (cf 
Fuchs 2004). While exposing the androcentric nature of biblical texts, she is of 
the opinion that the agency of women in the past can be reconstructed “in 
spite of distortion and loss and silence” (Schaberg 2004:viii). In fact, we need 
a memory of women who have suffered and resisted patriarchal oppression, 
but “who have also spoken and acted in the power of the Spirit Sophia” 
(Fuchs 2004:5). In answer to critics, who understand her view as that of 
propagating an unbroken lineage between contemporary struggles of 
feminists and the “discipleship of equals” identified by her in early Christianity, 
she points to the dialectical nature of this relation in her work (Castelli 2004: 
43).  
 In a sense Hampson and Schüssler Fiorenza’s work have different foci. 
As a systematic theologian Hampson is mainly concerned with what 
Christianity to a large extent became since the fourth century and, at least 
officially, remained up to the present.  Schüssler Fiorenza focuses on what it, 
according to her, once was, namely a “discipleship of equals”. She associates 
this ideal with Jesus and the earliest Jesus movement (Pears 2004:116). But 
even if the more remote (and egalitarian?) past of Christianity would be the 
focus, Hampson questions its potential for empowering present day women. It 
is not that she questions the project of writing a different kind of history. “Every 
age rewrites history, and history affects how we view ourselves” (Hampson 
1998:65). While a view of the past from a different angle may have the 
function of showing us how far male history has been biased, that is, makes 
us aware of what has mostly been invisible, she questions both Schüssler 
Fiorenza’s portrayal of the early Jesus movement as a “discipleship of 
equals”, and that contemporary women should identify with women in the past 
for their present empowerment (Hampson 1998:66). For this she regards the 
gap between present and past too big. “More than in any other similar space 
of time the world for our generation is new ... Is it not the case that ... we 
should be making our decisions in relation to the world that is coming, rather 
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than in relation to even a recent past?” (Hampson 1998:67). As is the case 
with individual people, we should understand our past in order not to be 
governed by it, but to be free for the future (Hampson 1998:68). And: “In our 
age discontinuity would seem to be stronger than continuity. The future is 
perhaps imaginatively present to us as it has been to no other generation ... 
Shall we not live more effectively if psychologically we are free from the past?” 
(Hampson 1998:68, 69). Quoting Carol Christ, she distinguishes between an 
intellectual and conceptual debt to Western biblical traditions and loyalty to it 
(Hampson 1998:4). In her view women “should have more guts than to 
capitulate to some supposed inevitability of having to reread and reinterpret 
the biblical tradition” (Hampson 1998:76).  
 In her reflection on and critique of Schüssler Fiorenza Hampson draws 
attention to an issue crucial to feminist criticism, also dealt with in depth by the 
Danish biblical scholar Lone Fatum in a number of articles, namely the 
attempt by feminist scholars to achieve two different results through the one 
analytical process of feminist critical exegesis: On the one hand exposing the 
suppression of women by the biblical material, while, on the other, seeking the 
affirmation of women by this material (Fatum 1989:61). This procedure is 
according to Fatum prompted by Christian apologetics, which limits feminist 
exegesis and makes light of the suppressive evidence in the biblical texts and 
tradition (Fatum 1989:61). For Fatum (1989:62), the exposure of 
discrimination and suppression is a feminist theological aim in itself. In line 
with this she problematises the view “that feminist theological insight and 
experience of spirituality have to be authorized by Scripture, legitimated if not 
by canon then at least by a canon within the canon”. Significantly she refers to 
this in a careful argued article on Galatians 3:28, one of the Pauline texts 
usually embraced by feminist scholars as a result of its supposed egalitarian 
nature and agenda (Fatum 1989:63; cf also Fatum 1991, 2005).  
 
5. HAMPSON ON PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE 
CHRISTIAN BELIEF SYSTEM AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 
 
5.1 A transcendent monotheism 
In dealing with and problematising aspects of Christian thought Hampson is 
fully aware of the complexity of the matter, and that care should be taken not 
to reduce the complexity of material which has developed over two thousand 
years in widely different cultures. She admits that what she deals with is not 
necessarily true of all Christian theology in all traditions at all times. However, 
a number of major still influential, one could even add, indispensable themes 
can be detected (Hampson 2002:119).  
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The first matter she deals with is transcendent monotheism, regarded by her 
as the most basic theme to Western religion, central to the Hebrew Scriptures, 
adopted by Christians and probably still representative of the public 
perception as to what God is (Hampson 2002:123). Much critical work has 
already been done on monotheism by both Jewish and Christian scholars. 
With regard to the absolutist tendency which may be integral to this belief, 
William Hamilton, for example, wrote: “If I believe in one God, I believe in one 
truth, and I believe I possess that one truth”. And: “To possess God is to 
possess the most powerful possible instrument of self-approval our times 
have devised, and the mirror of self-approval turns readily into a sword of 
judgement” (Hamilton 1993:13, 14). What Hampson finds especially 
problematic is that this God is placed hierarchically above humankind, as self-
sufficient and as having absolute power and knowledge. While God is 
presented as perfect and powerful, humanity is portrayed as weak and sinful. 
“The point to note here is that a transcendent monotheism, by its very nature, 
creates that which is “other” than itself. Monotheism makes for hierarchical 
structures, in which what is God and what is not God are understood by 
contrast with what the other is” (Hampson 2002:125). Not only does 
monotheism, conceived in male imagery, imply opposition between God and 
human beings; according to her, it also had and has social consequences in 
that it played a role in keeping male hegemony and hierarchy in place 
(Hampson 2002:126). Monotheism has been integral to western patriarchal 
culture (Hampson 2002:128). Scholars do point to a correlation between 
ancient Israel being monotheistic and the way gender was constructed in that 
society (Hampson 2002:127). It is indeed striking “that the God of monotheism 
was designated by names which suggested superior males in that society: 
King, Lord and Judge” (Hampson 2002:127). This reflects an “extrapolation of 
the human hierarchy into the realm of the divine” (Hampson 2002:5). Whereas 
this has in the past been regarded as “how it is and should be”, it is nowadays 
realised to be constructed and problematised. The God of monotheism, who 
allows no competition, who has the first and the last word, under whose 
control everything is, does, according to Hampson, not fit feminist 
ideals/values of relationality, heterogeneity, multiplicity and a lack of control 
(Hampson 2002:129). According to her the social basis which supports such 
an understanding of God, that of a hierarchical relation between men and 
women, is in our time rapidly being overcome (Hampson 2002:249). That God 
is primarily understood as Father in the New Testament does, according to 
her, not substantially change the divine/human relationship. Referring to the 
Lord ’s Prayer, and the positive elements it contains, even the nobility it 
reflects, Hampson points out that the characteristics of monotheism are still in 
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tact. God is still envisaged to be “in heaven”, “a reality both other than ours 
and which transcends ours”, which reflects a patriarchal and hierarchical order 
(Hampson 2002:129, 130). She admits that the portrayal in the Scriptures of 
the monotheistic God as powerful, as One who in some instances overturns 
the unjust structures of society, and the theology related to this view, such as 
liberation theology, did result in societal change. It is, however, questionable 
whether this portrayal of God has the power to generate another paradigm of 
reality than that of “power over” needed in our time (Hampson:2002:132, 133; 
1990a:378). While some biblical writings, such as Isaiah, and some 
theologians do attribute motherly qualities to the male God, this, in Hampson’s 
(2002:180, 181) view, only leads to an expansion of maleness.  
 
5.2 Humans as sinful beings 
Everyone growing up in a Christian environment will be aware of the centrality 
of sin to Christianity’s view of human beings. In fact, sin is such a crucial piece 
of the Christian puzzle that the Christian myth would probably crumble without 
it; there would hardly be need for some of its other components. It is this 
sinfulness which places human beings in apposition to God. Not only does 
Hampson (2002:142) question the “Fall”  into sin by human beings, usually 
based on a literal, and Augustinian, reading of Genesis 2, 3, as many biblical 
scholars nowadays do, and the common portrayal in Christianity of human 
beings as in apposition to God, which presupposes a hierarchical construction 
of reality. She also questions the major understanding of sin in the Western 
tradition, namely sin as pride, which in her and other feminist scholars’ view 
does not fit the position in which women mostly have been during the past 
centuries (e. g. Saiving 1979). This questioning applies to the recommended 
cure for this predicament as well, that of  “the crucifixion of the sinful self, the 
self which is centred in itself” (Hampson 1990:127), the “breaking of an old 
self and the finding of a new” which has been so influential in popular 
Christian piety and which she relates specifically to the theology of Martin 
Luther (Hampson 1988a:240; cf Armstrong 2004:63, 64 for this theme within 
Roman Catholicism; for a thoughtful response to Hampson and a view more 
sympathetic to that of Luther see Sponheim 1995). In this regard she asks 
questions such as: Is a twice-born model really useful? Should women not 
rather come “to themselves”, develop what they already have and are 
(Hampson 1988a:240, 241)? According to her “the Gospel of powerlessness 
has been appropriated by those to whom it should never have been directed” 
(Hampson 1988a:239). Since sin has in Christianity often been understood in 
individualistic terms, as a disruption in the relation between an individual and 
God, Christian ethics in her view failed “to provide a theoretical foundation for 
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the establishment of wide-ranging social justice” (Hampson 1990:125). 
Further: Would women, whose lives are often lived in different kinds of and 
more interrelated contexts than men, have identified the same problems as 
fundamental to the human condition, for example the problem of Angst, which 
has preoccupied so many male theologians (Hampson 1990:137-140)?    
 Her own view of human beings and her construal of the “self” is in 
sharp contrast with this. The “self” is in itself a contested entity and has again 
become a research topic of its own, something to which attention cannot be 
paid here, where our interest is in Hampson’s view. The view of personhood, 
or of the “self” which functions in her work, informed as it is by modernity, 
romanticism and feminist ethics, is an autonomous self, of people coming into 
their own, “to” themselves. This entails thinking for oneself and the taking of 
responsibility, but excludes the domination of some by others. This is, 
according to her, not the Christian view, where a revelation or an institution 
must take precedence over what one would oneself think. And which still 
includes domination of some by others (Hampson 1996:3). Her view of the 
autonomous human being is in the end constitutive of her re-conceptualisation 
of God, in which not only male God talk becomes problematic, but God talk in 
terms of parenthood (cf under 6 below). The “self” with which she comes up 
is, however, not an individualistic, isolated one, but what she calls a “self-in-
relation”. Her view of human beings is indeed much more optimistic than the 
traditional Christian one (Hampson 2002:38).  
 If in the Christian tradition the view of human beings has often been 
extremely pessimistic, this tradition’s view of women can be described as the 
cherry on the (pessimistic) cake. This was often not spotted or acknowledged 
by male scholars, since the characterisation of women in the Bible and 
Christianity and the “place” awarded to them were for most of the Christian 
era regarded as divinely ordained and therefore “natural”. When realised,  this 
was and is often still veiled and “solved” by means of the “sugarising” 
interpretations which has become so characteristic of Christianity, especially 
but not only in its popular manifestations. Since women entered academic 
scholarship this has been more clearly realised and made explicit. Here is not 
the place to deal in detail with this matter (cf Hampson 2002:169-211). A few 
remarks are in order.  
 In the well known words of Simone de Beauvior woman has in Western 
culture been “defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he in 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other” (in 
Hampson 2002:169). This is true of the biblical writings and Christianity as 
well and is related to the one-sex model which functioned in the then world, 
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expressed inter alia in the influential characterisation by Aristotle of woman as 
“not another kind of  (equal) human being, but a misbegotten male” (Hampson 
2002:8). Not only has man in Christianity given woman a “place” (Hampson 
2002:169). The main images of woman in Christianity and Christian history, 
woman as ideal (mostly mother), as complement to the male and as slut,  all 
fit into the “scheme”  devised by men (Hampson 2002:169-211). What is, 
according to Hampson, lacking in the male construal, also evident in, for 
example, the portrayal of the virgin Mary, is a sense of woman as an 
independent agent (Hampson 2002:174).  
 
5.3 Jesus 
How does her standing outside Christianity affect her view of Jesus, and what 
is in systematic theology called Christology? Her view of Jesus (and in the 
end of Christology) should be related to her historical consciousness and her 
position “after Christianity”, from which the need to “twist and save”, to keep 
Christian dogmas about Jesus in tact and to succumb to “the peril of 
modernising Jesus” (Cadbury 1961) vanishes. The broad contours of her view 
about him are in line with what most historical Jesus scholars would 
nowadays acknowledge: That Jesus was someone deeply in tune with (his) 
God, who lived with trust in (his) God and that he was a teacher and healer. 
She even thinks that Jesus, as no one else in Western history, was able to 
actualise God in the world (Hampson 1997:95). And admits that, as a Western 
person, her understanding of God has at least partly been shaped by Jesus of 
Nazareth (Hampson 1990:63, 64).  
 With regard to Jesus and women she, unlike many feminist Christian 
biblical scholars and theologians as well as male scholars sympathetic to 
women’s cause, resists the temptation of bringing Jesus in line with feminist 
ideals, rather taking historical insights seriously. For Jesus as “feminist” there 
is, according to her, “not a shred of evidence”. This is not to blame him or to 
regard him as a misogynist, but to take seriously his society and Jesus as part 
of it, where not even the minimum definition of feminism, that of equality 
between men and women, prevailed. In her words: “Indeed, one might well 
say how could such equality have occurred to Jesus, given the society in 
which he lived” (Hampson 1990:87). “He was in no ways concerned with 
those issues which must concern us” (Hampson 1990:90). That Jesus first 
appeared to women, often regarded as evidence of his revolutionary attitude 
towards them, should be understood in relation to the long history of women 
as mourners and attendants to the dead. Hampson quotes with consent the 
words of Judith Ochshorn, a scholar of near eastern culture: “Jesus was 
neither a feminist nor a misogynist. His central message simply lay 
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elsewhere”. This is in line with current historical scholarship on Jesus and 
women, for example the recent collection of essays by Kathleen Corley 
(2002). It is, according to Hampson, especially the male symbolism of 
Christianity, in which Christ as male is seen as representative of (a male) 
God, which has been harmful to women, privileging males and distorting 
human relationships (Hampson 1990:75-78). Of this she is extremely critical 
(Hampson 1990:50-80).  
 
5.4 The theme of sacrifice 
The theme of sacrifice, central to Judaism and deeply ingrained in the 
Christian psyche as a means by which the gap between the good God and 
sinful human beings is bridged, also receives critical attention in Hampson’s 
work. Feminist scholars in general are negatively disposed towards this idea 
(Brown & Bohn 1989), which has been closely related to violence (cf Girard 
2003). Both the command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac and Jesus’ death 
interpreted as a sacrifice are problematised by Hampson. In the case of the 
former she refers to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, where he discusses 
the Abraham and Isaac episode, and where he calls God’s command to 
Abraham a “teleological” suspension of the ethical. That the ethical relation to 
others, that is not to kill, can be suspended by a countermand from God, is 
according to her the consequence of conceiving God as other than creation. 
Such a demand opens up the possibility that the will of God can contravene 
what human beings perceive to be right (Hampson 2002:137). While , in 
dealing with this episode, the emphasis is often on the positive of Abraham’s 
unconditional obedience, with her the emphasis shifts to the question of what 
kind of God those believed in who transmitted the story of Abraham and Isaac 
over generations. “How could ‘he’ play with humans in this manner, to test 
absolute loyalty to ‘him’” (Hampson 2002:142)? She, interestingly, refers to a 
midrash on this passage written by a feminist scholar, in which inter alia the 
following words are put into the mouth of Sarah, questioning Abraham’s 
unconditional obedience: “What kind of God would want you to kill your own 
son to prove how religious you are? … She’s trying to teach you something; 
that you must challenge even the highest authority on questions of right and 
wrong. Argue with Her, wrestle with Her! But Sarah’s words smacked to 
Abraham of blasphemy, and he went into the mountains with his Son Isaac” 
(Hampson 2002:139). Though the “historical Sarah” would hardly have been 
able to utter these words, a modern one helps us to look at this episode with 
different eyes.  
 The theme of sacrifice, specifically the death of Jesus interpreted in this 
way, present in the Pauline letters and in the letter to the Hebrews, is still 
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reiterated endlessly in the Christian churches. It is “the mechanism through 
which God’s wrath is held to be turned into forgiveness” (Hampson 2002: 
149). In this regard one thinks of the millions that flocked to Mel Gibson’s The 
passion of the Christ, and the statements one still hears from some pulpits 
that “God wanted to see blood” or even “that He had to kill Jesus”. Why has 
this theme been so influential, especially in the form of the Anselmian 
doctrine, where Christ pays a recompense for sin? On the theme of sacrifice, 
and the view of God it presupposes, Hampson quotes the following words of a 
former Catholic priest, who does not think that this is the message of the 
Gospel: “At the core of these is a violent God who can never be satisfied with 
the human project …The key apparatus and conceptual grip of this God is 
ritual sacrifice involving an innocent victim, something … deeply embedded in 
our thinking”. With regard to Jesus’ death on the cross he writes: “… one 
event in Scripture obliterates in significance all other events: the Crucifixion” 
(2002:151). While not all of Christianity has been like this, many Christians are 
still of the opinion that this is what Christianity is primarily about. 
 
5.5 The maleness of the Christian symbol system and its effects 
Though the maleness (and male-constructedness) of the Christian symbol 
system is already implicit in the above, and should by now be evident, before 
coming to Hampson’s  own view it is appropriate to again refer to it in passing. 
According to John Hick the relativity of religion to human cultures, the fact that 
the forms of religious belief, experience and practice are culturally 
conditioned, is today common knowledge - though like many other aspects of 
modern knowledge it has had to push its way to general consciousness 
against the weight of pre-modern dogmas.  The maleness of God in biblical 
religions not only reflects but validates the patriarchal human societies whose 
traditions they are. To affirm a divine reality – which Hick does – is not to 
claim that that reality is accurately defined by those concepts (Hick 1989:202).  
 The realisation of the effect of religious symbol systems is not restricted 
to feminist biblical scholars and theologians. Realising the powerful effect of 
symbols, the conservative Christian apologist C S Lewis, for example, wrote 
that a child who had been taught to pray to a Mother in heaven would have a 
religious life radically different from that of a Christian child. For him, as for 
most conservatives through the centuries and up to the present, the 
masculine imagery is given, that is, inspired (Hampson 1990:82). The male 
constructedness of biblical God talk has been made invisible by the concept of 
divine revelation and has for many centuries gone unnoticed, since for most of 
Christian history male insiders were regarded as God’s official and legitimate 
spokespersons. There were therefore only male interpreters of the traditions. 
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Not only were women up to the present not involved in conceptualising God; 
as part of a patriarchal world they did not even understand that there was 
such a question (Hampson 2002:257). In fact, in most contemporary Christian 
circles it is still not realised that the biblical images are metaphors for God, not 
descriptions of “Him”.  
 
6. A DIFFERENT KIND OF GOD TALK 
What if the male metaphors are not given, if they originated in specific social 
contexts, which they reflect (Hampson 1990:81)? This is clearly the view 
taken by Hampson as she sets out to come up with a “theism” that will, 
according to her, be in line with the insights and needs of our time, and will not 
endorse sexism. In doing this, we shall, according to her, “be doing no more 
than did others in their time, drawing on the cultural milieu in which they lived” 
(Hampson 1990:171).   
 The ideal of religion without dogma, hierarchy and absolutism, and in 
step with one’s own time, as well as the question of one’ s relation to religious 
traditions/symbols, crucial to Hampson’s work is, of course, not an exclusively 
feminist one, nor a new one – though from a feminist perspective it acquires a 
more pointed dimension. Apart from the work of liberal Christian scholars, this 
is, for example, dealt with in compelling ways in works of literature. In a 
lecture called “Is nothing sacred?” the Muslim writer Salman Rushdie 
addressed the question whether the religious mentality can survive outside of 
religious dogma and hierarchy (Hamilton 1993:2). According to him the great 
religions are now engaged in the task of keeping us from religion – something 
in which we should not allow them to succeed. In the interpretation and 
ordering of religiousness the artist may in Rushdie’s view be of help (Hamilton 
1993:4). In the Australian novelist Patrick White’s Riders in the chariot 
religious issues are indeed central. All four main characters in the novel lead 
religious lives, though only two of them are conventionally religious. Even 
these are not merely confirmers of received tradition, but seekers of the truth 
and of meaning in dialogue with their religious traditions. In the black 
American writer Alice Walker's moving The Color Purple, dealt with in some 
detail by Hampson (1990:162-167), in Theology and feminism, the main 
character is led by her woman friend to a different view of God after she had 
suffered immensely from her relationships with her father and husband, which 
affects her view of God as traditionally conceived and results in questioning 
“Him”. With “man off her eyeball”, according to her friend for her a prerequisite 
for reaching a different view of God, God is, for her, no longer male, no longer 
conceived anthropomorphically, but part of the one reality of all that is 
(Hampson 1990:166).  
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 To return to Hampson’s work: In the introductions to both her major 
books, and by means of occasional brief remarks dispersed through her work, 
the reader is prepared for her own attempt at God talk which would follow on 
her discussion and criticism of Christianity. While she is not, as many other 
feminist theologians, concerned with a reinterpretation/revisioning of 
Christianity which would meet the needs of feminist women, she does intend 
to reinterpret what being a religious person might entail (Hampson 1990:1). 
This is for her even an urgent matter (Hampson 2002:xxii). In addition to 
crucial aspects of her “outfit” discussed up to now such as her taking seriously 
of the modern view of the world and of history, and various insights of feminist 
scholarship, among others the view of the human person as autonomous and 
related which it espouses, spirituality is in her work never totally out of sight. In 
fact, characteristic of her work is an attempt to keep it together with other 
crucial aspects of her work, even at times arguing from it. In contrast to other 
contemporary theological positions such as non-realism, mainly associated 
with the work of Don Cupitt in England, continuity with the past lies, for her, 
not in the retaining of language and symbols regarded to no longer refer to 
something “outside” themselves, but in a qualified “theism”. While many would 
disagree, and indeed disagree with her view (Ruether 1987; Coakly 1991; 
Anderson 1993), the amount of thought – and life – which she brings to her 
God talk, integrated as these are in her work, gives to it an honesty and 
integrity in a field where the “private” and “public” often still exist, and are 
allowed to exist, separately. That her work is not merely or only intended for 
women (Hampson 2002:xx), and has more than feminist interests in view, 
should be clear from the matters which she addresses; it forms part of a larger 
endeavour, of what Peter Berger calls  “the heretical imperative” in theology 
which has become necessary in the aftermath of modernity, characterised by 
pluralisation and the move from fate to choice, with inevitable implications for 
religion (Berger 1980:11).  While in many other cases this entails or has 
entailed a struggle with the Christian tradition (e g Marcus Borg from the 
perspective of historical Jesus research and the feminist scholars mentioned 
above), she has taken a different route, in that she detaches God talk from the 
Christian belief system. If at this time it has already become clear why she 
characterises her position as “After Christianity”, this is confirmed in her 
dealing with (the concept of) God and her own reconceptualisation of it. In line 
with her conviction that conceptualisations of God are related to specific social 
and cultural contexts, she intends to come up with a notion of God which will 
be “tenable in this day and age” (Hampson 1990:48), and which will respond 
to the advance in human knowledge and human ethical standards (Hampson 
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1997:98). In her view there is no privileged age, which would require that our 
understanding has to conform to the understanding of that past age 
(Hampson 1990:171).  
 
6.1 In dialogue with Schleiermacher 
Though Hampson’s thought is related to the non-anthropomorphic way of 
speaking about God propounded by, for example, Paul Tillich and John 
Robinson, and to what is nowadays named panentheism (cf Borg 1997), she 
does not really enter into dialogue with the proponents of these views, or use 
their terminology. It is to Friedrich Schleiermacher that she turns in her 
attempt at reconceptualising God, or then expressing what she means by 
“God”. As others in our time do when the issue of religious experience is at 
stake or in an attempt to think and speak again in and for our time (Burhenn 
1995; Geldhof 2004; Berger 1980:125-156). In his On religion: Speeches to its 
cultured despisers and his later work The Christian faith Schleiermacher made 
clear his discontentment with orthodox confessional theology and contended 
with, or then chose to take seriously Enlightenment thought. In his work, as in 
that of Hampson, the insights of Immanuel Kant play an important role. It is 
precisely Schleiermacher’s response to Kant which Hampson finds crucial and 
of which she makes use in her work. Schleiermacher, namely, distinguished 
religion from both knowledge (or science) and morality, thereby coming up 
with a structured way of thinking about the nature of religious consciousness 
(Hampson 1999:30) It was the heritage and continuous impact of Kant’s 
epistemology which prevented Schleiermacher from falling back into 
traditional theistic thinking, though he did remain Christian (Geldhof 2004:90). 
Apart from Enlightenment thought he was also deeply influenced by 
Romanticism with its emphasis on “mind-and-heart” (Barzun 2001:465-470) 
and therefore on the connectedness of things. It is this double heritage which 
resonates with Hampson, with her emphasis on the intellectual and human 
autonomy, and on relatedness, epitomised in the feminist view of the “self” as 
a self-in-relation. Apart from the fact that he distinguished religion from 
knowledge and morality, she mentions and finds helpful other aspects of his 
work: that he founded theology in human awareness or experience and not in 
revelation (cf also Berger 1980:127-156); that for him religion did not 
essentially consist in propositions; that before dealing, in his speeches, with 
Christianity he was concerned with religion in general, irrespective of any form 
it might take, and especially his conceptualising of the “self” as immediately 
connected to that which is more than the self, which he variously named the 
universe, the divine and God (Hampson 2002:213). To this can be added his 
optimistic view of human beings and his view that when religion is alien to 
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people’s lives it loses its relevance and meaning (Geldhof 2002:99, 108, 109).  
In Hampson’s interpretation of his work, the view of the self as immediately 
connected to that which is more than the self precludes a heteronomous 
relation to God, something which her view of human beings as autonomous 
persons requires: “What I wish to bring to the fore – and what attracts me to 
Schleiermacher’s conceptualisation – is the lack of the possibility of any 
heteronomy in the human relation to God”, a matter on which Schleiermacher 
has according to her often been misunderstood (Hampson 2002:213, 218; 
1996). In his thought human self-consciousness and God-consciousness were 
indeed closely intertwined (Burhenn 995:147; cf also Hampson 1990a:172; 
1990b:374). For him the underlying experience of religion, its essence, was 
the encountering of the infinite (that is, God) in the finite phenomena of life 
(Schleiermacher 1958:31). According to Hampson Schleiermacher’s founding 
of theology in human awareness “could not have occurred other than against 
the background of the Romantic interest in the subjectivity of the human 
person and belief in the relatedness of the individual to the whole” (Hampson 
2002:215).  
 Schleiermacher’s thought and the criticism of it are complex matters 
which cannot be dealt with here in detail (Hampson 2002:212-223, Geldhof 
2004). He has been accused of proposing the existence of a universal 
religious experience which he regarded as a stable basis on which a tradition 
rests (cf Geldhof 2004:90 for theologians who have this view). And that he 
treated religious experience as an immediate consciousness that is not 
shaped by concepts and beliefs (Proudfoot, in Burhenn 1995:155). It has, 
however, been argued that Schleiermacher fully realised the embeddedness 
of experience in historical determinate contexts (Geldhof 2004:101). Hampson 
is of the opinion that Schleiermacher’ s thought would even be able to 
withstand the criticism of those according to whom there cannot be religious 
experience unpolluted by concepts and beliefs  (Hampson 2002:220-223).   
 
6.2 Hampson on “that reality called God” 
Hampson’s own attempt to say something about “that reality which is God” 
(2002:viii) is less a philosophical justification of faith than an attempt to give 
expression to what is, for her, clearly a reality, not merely a construct in 
language (Hampson 1990:169). Her own God talk is based on what she 
considers to be the “evidence” for a spiritual dimension of reality which she 
calls God (Hampson 2002:214, 222). What counts for her as “evidence” do 
not presuppose interventions, a “God of the gaps”, which would be 
incompatible with her view of the world as scientific and interconnected.  
These entail things that would always and everywhere be potentially possible 
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and are related to a more extensive view of reality than what is commonly 
acknowledged in a post-Enlightenment age. Examples are given from her own 
life and from reports sent to the Oxford Religious Experience Research Unit, 
in which case no move is made from the described phenomena to what they 
may imply: the efficacy of prayer, healing (mental and physical), intuition or 
extra-sensory experience and the conviction that “if people go forward in trust 
(or faith) unexpected coincidences occur. Needs will be provided for or a way 
forward will open up” (Hampson 2002:227). This leads her to say that “there is 
more to reality than meets the eye”, a spiritual reality which gives rise to what 
can not always be explained. She admits that the theological move from the 
“evidence” to what it may be thought to imply will involve a leap (Hampson 
2002:230). What she has in mind is clearly something different from a flight 
into mystery to defend the literalness and uniqueness of one’s own belief 
system.  
 Religious experience has in our time again become an important topic 
in talk about God, religion and religious traditions. There is again, from a 
number of perspectives, a lot of academic reflection on it (Hood 1995). This is 
true for some of the same reasons as in Schleiermacher’s time. The 
development of historical criticism and currently social scientific study 
displayed the Christian past as “all too human”, while the reality and 
appreciation, at least by some, of religious diversity makes a special 
revelation increasingly problematic (Burhenn 1995:146). The obvious place to 
start is then with human beings and their experiences. With reference to 
Vergote, Geldhof points out that the term “religious experience” is a fairly 
recent concept, an inheritance from theories which at the beginning of the 
twentieth century “sought to explain the origins of religion and to justify their 
truth and value as founded in an original and emotional form of knowledge” 
(Geldhof 2004:95). This does not exclude that that to which this term refers 
could have existed earlier (Geldhof 2004:95). The matter of religious 
experience is a complex one, beset by various questions which cannot be 
dealt with here in full. What is the evidential value of what is called religious 
experience? What complicates possible inferences from it? Two matters 
pointed out by Burhenn should be noted in passing. On the one hand the 
discrediting of empiricism as a theory of knowledge resulted in some 
philosophers arguing for a more positive evaluation of the epistemological 
value of religious experience (Burhenn 1995:150). On the other hand there is 
the realisation, in twentieth century philosophy, of the complex relation 
between language and “reality”, and of the role of concepts in shaping 
religious experience, that is, that religious experience arises through a 
complex interplay with concepts and beliefs (Burhenn 1995:156, 156; 
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Davaney 1987). Hampson is fully aware of these problems. Admitting to the 
complex relation between language and reality in the wake of deconstruction, 
even quoting Derrida, she questions the view that “all there is … is language” 
(Hampson 1997:96).  
 One of the reviewers of her books remarks how difficult it is to create a 
space for God talk and spirituality after Christianity’s ethos has dominated for 
so long (Isherwood 1998). This can be related to Christianity being commonly 
equated to holding a certain set of beliefs, and the view that without the 
affirmation these beliefs no religion, and indeed no salvation is possible 
(Hampson 2002:257). Hampson realises the difficulty of the endeavour. She 
admits of having a “skinny God”, something of which Schleiermacher was also 
accused (Hampson 2002:253). In her view feminist thought, with its emphasis 
on relatedness, may provide a context in which a rethinking of the notion of 
God may be undertaken (Hampson 1990:149). She thinks of God as “a 
dimension of the totality that is”, as “connected to all that is”, something 
greater than ourselves with which we can be “in tune”, to which human beings 
can be open, with which they are interrelated and on which they can draw 
(Hampson 1998a:247-249; 2002:231, 236). This would be in line with the 
emphasis on interconnectedness in the current world view (cf Hampson 
1988b:341). In the context of this thought something like prayer, and its effect, 
traditionally associated with a personal God and with some kind of  
“intervention” can, according to her, still be meaningful, although as yet we 
have little understanding of its “workings” (Hampson 2002:244). She 
conceptualises God in a non-hierarchical way, not over against human beings, 
in opposition to them. God is, moreover, portrayed in non-anthropomorphic 
terms: not by means of traditional male metaphors, not at all in terms of 
parenthood, not even, as by some other feminist theologians, by means of 
“new” life-enhancing personal metaphors such as “lover” and “friend” (Mc 
Fague 1987) . What is, according to her, needed, is a more dynamic view of 
God, for which she uses terms such as energy, light, love, power and healing 
(Hampson 2002:251). In discussing prayer, where an “I – Thou” relation, and 
therefore personal categories, usually functions, she admits that personal 
categories for God would perhaps at times be inescapable. This has to do 
with human beings, their needs and their potential for conceptualising and 
should not be carried over into an attempt to conceptualise God (Hampson 
2002:242, 243). That she herself does not completely escape from personal 
categories, is clear from the use of expressions such as “love of God” and “the 
relationship between God and the self”, usually associated with God 
conceptualised as a person (Hampson and Ruether 1987:8; Hampson 
2002:xiii).  
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 That her vision is in the end a hopeful one, is clear from the fact that 
the idea of God has, for her, a transcendental function. This, she again 
admits, involves a leap of faith, not of the kind that Kierkegaard proposed, but 
a faith “that the whole is in some way good or makes sense” (Hampson 
2002:245). With God no longer regarded as an anthropomorphic agent who 
can intervene at will, there is in her view a greater emphasis on human 
responsibility, with (what she regards as) God involved in the process of  
people coming to themselves (Hampson 2002:238). According to her this view 
of God also solves the theodicy question (Hampson 2002:234ff).  
 The way she thinks about religion and the place of human beings 
becomes clear in her discussion of spirituality and praxis. If religion is no 
longer tied to a set of beliefs regarded to be objectively true, but about being a 
certain kind of person, and with human beings awarded a more positive and 
crucial place in the “scheme of things”, the religious scenery changes 
substantially. Instead of asking how God wants human beings to live, she 
changes the direction of this question by asking: “Are there certain ways of 
being in the world which would seem to be prerequisite to gaining awareness 
of that dimension of reality which I have called God?” (Hampson 2002:258). In 
this regard she selects a number of refreshingly down to earth “virtues”, some 
of which are emphasised by women philosophers such as Iris Murdoch and 
Martha Nussbaum: honesty and integrity, attention and the ordering of one’s 
life (cf Hampson 2002:260ff for a detailed discussion). From her discussion it 
is clear that the kind of spirituality she proposes is neither otherworldly nor of 
an instant and opportunistic kind. For Iris Murdoch “attention … allows a 
process of deepening and complicating”. And according to Martha Nussbaum 
‘Our highest and hardest task is to make ourselves people “on whom nothing 
is lost’”. Indeed virtues to live by.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Although an attempt has been made to give a fair and representative view of 
Daphne Hampson’s work, it has not been possible to do full justice to the 
comprehensive nature of her work in an article like this. With the focus on God 
talk, little attention has, for example, been paid to her view of Christology. It 
has, moreover, not been possible to do justice to the vibrancy of parts of her 
writing, and its nearness to life, which contributes to it having a lasting 
impression at least on this reader. A few concluding remarks are made here, 
recapitulating some of her crucial insights. 
 What we have in Hampson's work, as has become clear from the 
previous pages, is a view at Christianity from the outside by a former insider to 
Christianity, though never an uncritical one, and one thoroughly versed in the 
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tradition she fundamentally critiques. With the observation post  changed, and 
the revelation-tinted glasses removed from the eye of the beholder, one 
cannot but clearly see the embeddedness of the biblical writings and the 
Christian symbolism in past patriarchal cultures, the male-constructedness of 
biblical and Christian God talk, and therefore their bias against women. Since 
Hampson’s position is informed by both feminism and a qualified modernism, 
some aspects of her critique of Christianity resemble that of contemporary 
critical male theologians, while the feminist side of her position and critique 
provides it with an additional, even different dimension. In the case of 
transcendent monotheism, for example, it is not only the view of a personal 
God “outside” of our world which she finds problematic, but a male God 
hierarchically and ethically positioned over against human beings.  
 With the nature of the Christian past exposed, with it no longer being 
regarded as the locus of revealed truth and as obvious source for answers to 
present day questions, the relation between past and present is redefined in a 
way which differs substantially from that of traditional Christian theology and 
even some feminist theology. The locus of gravity moves from the past to the 
present, to contemporary human beings, their contexts and insights. This 
coheres with Hampson’s view of human beings as autonomous and 
responsible for their lives. Though she does not propose a complete 
discontinuity with the past, according to her we should in the sphere of 
religion, as in the case of all human knowledge and ideas, draw on the past 
when we consider it as true, valid or good, while past insights and values may 
be jettisoned with the rise of new knowledge or the coming to new moral 
insights (Hampson 2002:xiii). In a sense this is already happening in some 
some quarters. One, for example, thinks of the French scholar of religion 
Hervieu-Léger's reference to the historic religious traditions as “tool-boxes” 
from which human beings can freely draw in order to make sense of the world 
and of their own lives, not as pre-packaged answers to their quests (Cox 
1995:304, 305).  
 Significantly, Hampson’s rigorous intellectual inquiry and critical 
scrutiny of Christianity do not result in the eclipse of the spiritual, as often 
happens. In her God talk the de-compartmentalising tendency in her work is 
evident: according to her a different view of human beings and of the world 
inevitably leads to a different view of (what she still calls) “God”. Striking is her 
effort to go about in an argued way and in conversation with someone 
(Schleiermacher) who partly shares her frame of reference, thus attempting to 
create a context in which God talk may make sense in changed contexts. 
Some feminist insights, especially the emphasis on relatedness, are also 
brought to her attempt at a new kind of God talk.   
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 By characterising Hampson’s work as that of “one feminist theologian”  
and by referring to a few others, it has from the start been acknowledged that 
her view is not representative of feminist theologians’ view of and relation to 
Christianity, although there will be some similarities (cf Sawyer 1999). One of 
the main points of criticism against her work is the definition of Christianity in 
terms of the Christian myth and of Christians’ claim to uniqueness for Jesus 
as the Christ. This is regarded by her critics as a too restricted definition of 
Christianity, something to which Hampson (2002:xiv-xv) responded in the 
introduction to the second edition of After Christianity. Her definition of 
Christianity as a historical religion in the sense of a unique revelation in the 
past has been problematised by pointing out that Christianity is a developing 
and therefore still changing tradition, and that the Scriptures and the Christian 
tradition contain trends, also with respect to language for God, which counter 
patriarchal patterns (Ruether 1990). It is pointed out that the God she 
proposes is not unknown in the Christian tradition (Coakly 1991). Hampson is 
not unaware of strands in the tradition which correspond to what she wishes 
to say. This is, however, not the way God has been primarily conceived in 
Christianity (Hampson 1988a:247). Although more liberatory varieties of 
Christianity probably did exist through the centuries, and may nowadays 
function among those with a Christian background who no longer find 
themselves in the churches, in fairness to Hampson it has to be admitted that 
a “different” and more “open” kind of Christianity was and is still a rarity and is 
more or less non-existent in the official manifestations of Christianity. The 
question how far Christianity, including its major conception of God, can be 
stretched without losing its identity is a valid one. Even when more idealistic 
positions are pointed to or thought out within Christianity, it has to be admitted 
that much of what Hampson says rings true to how it still mostly functions. 
She indeed raises concerns in a radically pointed way and asks all important 
questions (Sponheim 1998; Isherwood 1998). While forcefully reminding us of 
the cultural contructedness of all talk on God, her work also poses the 
question of spirituality without adherence to a specific religious tradition. While 
she forces us to think again, and provides us with informed, extensive and 
fascinating material to think with, her own views may be helpful and open up 
new possibilities at a time at which many people are, in the sphere of religion, 
in search of something which makes sense in contemporary contexts and are 
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